



BY MERRAN SMITH WITH DARCY DOBELL



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Place of Power: Lessons from the Great Bear Rainforest

BY MERRAN SMITH WITH DARCY DOBELL

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introduction

The time seemed right. After almost a decade of working on human rights issues with indigenous people and environmental groups in Latin America, I had decided it was time to come home and work on an issue that was quickly gaining a lot of attention—the future of British Columbia's ancient coastal forests. I had accepted a forest campaigner job with the Sierra Club of British Columbia.

As I flew up to Bella Bella, a Heiltsuk community on the province's remote central coast, I couldn't help but compare the moonscape of northern Vancouver Island—every valley had been logged from top to bottom—to the luxuriously green vistas of what would come to be known as the Great Bear Rainforest. We flew for hours, rarely seeing signs of human impacts, crossing one spectacular valley after another. In over a decade of travel between Canada and Central America, I had rarely flown over such a pristine landscape. I realized that what I was seeing, valley after valley of unlogged ancient forests, was an increasingly rare and precious thing. I didn't know then how—or even if—it could be saved, but I knew I wanted to be part of an effort to try.

We touched down in Bella Bella, a community of slightly more than 1,000 people, and I walked the

mile from the airport to the village. I was soon in the basement of the church where the community college is located, drinking tea with one of the school's directors. She was the daughter of a hereditary chief, and would soon become an elder herself. She'd heard I was coming to Bella Bella, and she'd seen the challenges created when environmental groups visited nearby Bella Coola in previous years. She decided to teach me about her people before I had the chance to make the same mistakes as my predecessors. It turned out to be a great gift.

"My brain began to hurt. There was obviously something wrong with my answers."

"Why are you here?" she asked me. I explained that I worked for the Sierra Club, and that British Columbia's coast held one quarter of the world's remaining rainforest. "Yes, but why are you here?" she asked again. She kept asking me that same question as I continued to respond with the usual litany of environmental facts about the clear-cut logging that was about to devastate the area, about impacts on water

quality and the spawning grounds of wild salmon. My brain began to hurt. There was obviously something wrong with my answers, but she wasn't about to tell me what. Her kind eyes kept probing me, and she kept asking: "Why are you here?"

I tried a different tack. I spoke about how Vancouver Island communities were grappling with decline. Once timber companies destroyed and depleted the forests, I explained, the mills slowed down, or closed altogether. I assured her that this same kind of logging would inevitably come to her community, and that the forestry company was selling Heiltsuk a story that just wasn't true. When I told her that Bella Bella faced the same fate as other communities on Vancouver Island, I finally earned a raised eyebrow. At last I was on the right track. I had made the connection between the environment and community, between conservation and people. "You can't come in here and only talk about the environment, without talking about the people," she told me. "We don't separate our issues from the land."

As conservationists, our interests, passions, and rhetoric were at the time largely limited to the physical place: the rainforest. We knew there were aboriginal—in Canada, they are known as First Nations—communites in the area. While of course we paid lip service to supporting local sustainable livelihoods, in reality it was little more than a bullet-point on our brochures, a slide or two in our hour-long presentations.

That college director proved the first of many teachers I would come to have on the coast. The journey I had begun was to prove intense and personal beyond what I could have imagined. My first months of working on the coast were marked by meeting after meeting cancelled because of the deaths of elders, or worse, the suicides of children in despair. I was

starting to understand how simplistic and disrespectful it is to ask people to focus on "conservation" when they are burying their dead and struggling to revive their communities and culture. I came to understand that this profoundly beautiful landscape was home to people still dealing with the impacts of colonialism, racism, and injustice.

I changed. I had to. All of us working on the campaign changed as we spent time in the villages, speaking with leaders and community members, and learning that conservation was incredibly strong and alive on the central coast. Among First Nations, conservation is not an abstract value. Rather, it is at the root of who they are.

We also came to realize that the people knew what




they wanted. They wanted jobs so that the young people didn't leave their communities, jobs that were local, sustainable, and dignified. They wanted their title and rights to their land recognized, as well as the right to make their own decisions about their communities and territories. They wanted the ecosystems they depended upon to remain intact for the future.

While the conservation community limited our initial vision to the environmental campaign—protecting rainforests and developing new approaches to forestry—it soon became clear that we needed to build this vision together with First Nations. Healthy ecosystems would include strong and healthy communities living in them. We realized the vision had to include real substance about First Nations community goals, as well as ecological goals. But these realizations didn't come all at once, or always easily. It took time, and we had to learn how to listen, in order to build the trust it took to have a common vision.

"At times we were called enemies of the state, traitors, and worse."

But it wasn't just about trust. Coastal First Nations realized that environmental groups had something to offer as well: power.

In the Great Bear Rainforest, we had power from the marketplace. Environmental campaigns in Europe and the United States had made purchasers of wood from the Great Bear Rainforest aware that they were buying wood created by clear-cutting the planet's last large remaining tracts of temperate rainforest. It was a powerful message delivered with skill and passion, and it hit home. Big retailers like Home Depot, Lowes, Staples, IKEA and others did not want their brands associated with that kind of environmental destruction and controversy. These companies purchased a billion dollars' worth of British Columbia wood annually. Suddenly they were standing behind us, saying to the forest companies and the provincial government: "You need to fix this problem." They didn't prescribe an answer, but they rejected the status quo—and demanded that we sit down and create a solution that included clear environmental goals and standards.



We effectively carved out a new sphere of power and influence—the marketplace—equal to the existing powers of the government and the logging companies. We had achieved the power to destroy the coastal

logging industry, and government and industry had to learn to accept this. It would take time. It felt very different. Suddenly we were sitting down at meetings with logging representatives who couldn't just walk out. If they did, we headed back to our campaigns. Eventually they came back to the table to discuss what they originally thought were outrageous ideas. Those proposals—a moratorium on logging in valleys under discussion, or new kinds of forest practices, or protecting 100 valleys—were all part of the solution in the end.

As the Great Bear Rainforest campaign gained international attention, Western Canadian First Nations gained increasing authority over their rights and title to their lands. It was a time of *Delgamuuk v. British Columbia*—the first definitive statement

by the Supreme Court of Canada on aboriginal title. The Nisga'a were concluding a treaty after 100 years of effort. Haida elders stood on logging roads, and the Haisla protected the Kitlope Valley. Coastal First Nations started coming together and they created the Turning Point Initiative—their own new sphere of power based on the unity of nine First Nations speaking together.

These two spheres of power fundamentally changed the dynamic in the Great Bear Rainforest. The status quo was no longer an option. Traditional government and industry driven decision processes were no longer acceptable. For the first time, we had power and could negotiate as equals.

But a new responsibility came along with it. We had to find a way to incorporate the interests of the logging companies and provincial government without compromising the collective First Nation and environmental group vision of community and ecological sustainability. We knew that if the logging companies didn't see a place for themselves in the vision, they would fight it. We had to work with the companies and the First Nations to define ecosystem-based logging. We knew it had to be real and credible, and make sense to foresters and executives alike.

Thus the "vision"—the story of what we could create together—became bigger than any one group or sector. The growing international significance of the area, combined with the idea of creating a global conservation model, captured imaginations. It was a positive vision in a world with a lot of bad news. This in turn created a dynamic of its own. We knew we couldn't give up or walk away when it just seemed too complex or tough. If we couldn't succeed with this vision in an educated, wealthy, peaceful country like Canada, I realized, we could never expect Brazil, Indonesia or other nations to solve their own environmental problems. Failure was not an option. The world needed this story of hope.

But it would not come easily. At times we were called enemies of the state, traitors, or worse. Wise Use

and Share groups sprang up across the province in opposition to land use planning and coastal negotiations. Meanwhile, some in the broader conservation community felt a collaborative approach threatened their interests. At times the attacks grew personal and hateful, and they hurt. People involved had to keep asking themselves—is this the right path? It was. Over time, leaders arose from within forest companies, local and provincial governments, other coastal stakeholders, the environmental community and First Nations communities throughout the region. These leaders supported the campaign, and made the vision their own.

Leadership meant standing up to critics—and even to traditional allies—who resisted the idea of building solutions in partnership with their opponents. Leadership also meant expanding the concept of what was possible, and increasing the range of benefits available—not simply apportioning the benefits available under the status quo. It meant carefully

"We knew we couldn't give up or walk away when it just seemed too complex or tough."

nurturing the hope of future success. And it meant coming to terms with the fact that this work would never amount to a single story; the histories, perspectives, aspirations, and efforts of all parties would need weaving together to create a lasting solution.

Today, leadership is no less important in the Great Bear Rainforest as the parties move towards full implementation of their vision. The work may not always be as exciting as the battles of the past, but it is equally critical.

This document attempts to capture some of the lessons of the Great Bear campaign, lessons of power, listening, hope and faith. They are about problem solving. They are about how leadership—far more than innovation in process, or institutions—ultimately enables us to find solutions to the issues that challenge our communities and our planet.











the place and the people

Temperate rainforest ecosystems exist in only eleven regions of the world. The Great Bear Rainforest, on Canada's wild Pacific Coast beween Bute Inlet and the British Columbia-Alaska border, and including the remote archipelago of Haida Gwaii, represents one quarter of the world's remaining coastal temperate rainforest. At 74,000 square kilometres, or 28,500 square miles, it is an area larger than Ireland.

Here, thousand-year-old trees tower like skyscrapers. A network of hundreds of large and small watersheds sustains more biomass than any other terrestrial ecosystem. Forests, marine estuaries, inlets, and islands support tremendous biological diversity including grizzly bears, black bears, white Kermode bears (also known as "Spirit Bears"), genetically unique wolf populations, six million migratory birds, genetically diverse wild salmon runs, and a multitude of unique botanical species. The Great Bear Rainforest is indisputably an ecological treasure.

"...long simmering tensions in the woods began to boil over."

For millennia, these ecological riches have supported equally rich human cultures. The North and Central Coast and Haida Gwaii are the unceded

traditional territory of more than two dozen coastal First Nations. Outside of Prince Rupert—the region's only urban centre—First Nations comprise the majority of the region's population. They make their homes in small, isolated communities such as Klemtu, Bella Bella, Metlakatla and Oweekeno—villages only accessible by air or water.

Historically, First Nations carefully managed the abundant natural resources of both land and sea, relying on their knowledge of seasonal cycles to harvest a wide variety of resources without depleting them. They had absolute power over their traditional territories and resources. They had the right to govern, to make and enforce laws, to decide citizenship and to manage their lands and institutions.

The colonial era brought newcomers to the Great Bear Rainforest, along with a new economy based on logging, fishing, and shipping. The settlers built commercial harbours, pulp mills, sawmills, logging camps, canneries and mines. Many of these activi-



ties extracted resources from traditional territories over the protests of the people who lived there. While the enterprises turned profits for the companies and provided employment, there were few benefits to First Nations. Instead, their communities endured extensive economic, social and cultural damage.

By the 1990s, it was clearly time for a shift. The region's economy had dwindled to isolated logging camps, a much-reduced fishing fleet and a handful of tourist lodges scattered up and down the coast. Most First Nations communities suffered high unemployment and low graduation rates, limited infrastructure, poor health, substandard housing and low incomes. Piecemeal economic reconstruction efforts had all failed; unemployment rates soared as high as 80 percent. Non-aboriginal businesses, including some of the world's largest forestry companies, were also struggling through a deep financial crisis, spurred in part by declining commodities markets and punishing American trade duties.

Meanwhile, long-simmering tensions in the woods began to boil over. Environmental groups organized actions designed to draw media attention to logging practices. The protests forced the forestry companies to defend their activities and challenge their opponents in public. Conservation activists and First Nations protestors fought—sometimes separately, and sometimes side-by-side—to protect important ecological and cultural sites. The groups waged battles, valley by valley, up

"If the biggest logging protest in history couldn't actually save the rainforest, then what could?"

and down the south coast of British Columbia and Vancouver Island. The civil unrest came to a head in 1993, when police arrested more than 900 people for trying to prevent logging in Clayoquot Sound—the largest mass arrest in Canadian history. It was time for change.





early efforts in land use planning

In an effort to resolve environmental disputes, in 1992 the Government of British Columbia initiated a province-wide, strategic land use planning exercise. Unlike many other jurisdictions, most of the province's land is publicly owned, albeit with unresolved aboriginal rights and title. About 95 percent of the region's commercial forests are located on public land. This unique situation offered a strong incentive for multi-party planning.

The premise of the government's planning process was that those with a stake in the land—residents, resource companies, First Nations, environmentalists, workers and others—would inform decision—making through consensus recommendations, balancing resource development on the one hand with demands for higher levels of conservation on the other. While this goal was laudable, many land use planning tables were unable to reach consensus and, when consensus failed, the BC government made unilateral decisions on land use.

"Over the course of the campaign, we developed a bold, new vision for the region."

By the end of the 1990s, the process had doubled the amount of land protected in British Columbia. However, it had not challenged the dominant philosophy that the economy and the environment were inherently contradictory values, that First Nations were simply one of a number of stakeholders, and that significant decisions must ultimately rest solely in the hands of the British Columbia government.



In 1997, the province launched a pair of land-use planning processes for the central and north coasts. All of the region's land-use recommendations emerged from the two tables. Environmental groups, however, considered the process too constrained, and declined to participate. In our minds, the process fell short on the most critical issues of the day: the global ecological significance of the Great Bear Rainforest, the need for a science-based approach to protected areas and resource management, and the desperate need for new economic opportunities in the region.

Meanwhile, First Nations groups were reluctant to endorse a process that failed to recognize their





title and unique legal status. Some nations reluctantly engaged to represent their perspective, but did not endorse any recommendations. In particular, they fundamentally opposed their characterization as stakeholders.

That same year, the World Resources Institute declared Canada, Brazil and Russia the only places left on the planet with "frontier forests" still large enough to be ecologically sustainable over time. Fuelled by growing concern over this grim state of affairs and dismayed at what we saw as a fundamentally flawed planning process, environmentalists launched a campaign to raise awareness of the threats to the Great Bear Rainforest. Over the course of the campaign, we developed a bold new vision for the region:

- full protection of more than a quarter of the region's pristine rainforest;
- the establishment of more ecologically-sensitive logging practices over the remainder of the land;
- recognition of First Nations rights and title; and
- realignment of the regional economy away from dependence on industrial logging and toward more sustainable activities.

The vision represented an evolution in how environmental groups approach conservation. It went beyond our traditional focus—creating new parks—to include indigenous cultures and strengthen local economies.









new tactics for a new dynamic

If environmental groups were to realize this new and bold vision for coastal forestry, they'd need to find a way to influence two important players. Large, multinational forest companies held the timber rights to log much of the Great Bear Rainforest, and the provincial government held the decision-making power. The government was clearly not a passive player; its economic interests were closely aligned with those of the forestry companies.

The region's First Nations and environmental groups were obvious allies. However, relationships between the two had proven inconsistent. While both had at times worked closely together—such as on the Clayoquot Sound protests—at other times the relationship was characterized by mutual suspicion and even hostility. First Nations often saw environmental groups as outsiders whose proposed parks would limit economic and traditional-use options, and who showed little respect for aboriginal interests and knowledge. This alliance would take time and significant effort to nurture.

The conservation groups recognized that it was not only time for new allies, it was time for a new game plan. Until this point, we had attempted to build power by directly interfering with logging operations. Road blockades, tree-sits, and public protests cost companies time and money, and the resulting media attention helped build public support for forest preservation. However, the tactics also polarized the debate and helped to entrench the views of develop-

ment proponents as well as conservation advocates.

Moreover, as environmental groups contemplated a new campaign in British Columbia's vast and remote central and north coast regions, it was clear that it would not be possible either to sustain an ongoing blockade or to maintain an active on-site media presence. The Great Bear Rainforest was hundreds of kilometres from Vancouver, most of it accessible

"Protesters once seized control of a Home Depot publicaddress system: 'Spirit-bear habitat on sale in aisle seven!"

only by boat or plane. The complexity of logistics, the costs of transportation, the lack of infrastructure, and the sheer scale of the task—protecting more than 100 watersheds—ruled out conventional tactics from the outset.

In any case, they would not bring about the kind of change we needed to see. The Clayoquot protests



earned world-wide attention, resulted in the arrests of close to 1,000 citizens, and established new processes and institutions—including

British Columbia's first government-to-government joint-stewardship management board. But the actions did not result in any new legal protections. If the biggest anti-logging protest in our history couldn't actually save the rainforest, we asked ourselves, then what could?

Environmental groups took this question to the marketplace, targeting the international buyers of wood and paper products from coastal British Columbia. ForestEthics, Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network and other groups contacted corporations such as Home Depot, Staples, IKEA, the Fortune 500 companies and the German pulp and paper industry. We wanted to show them the destruction associated with their purchases.

A handful of purchasers immediately cancelled contracts with British Columbia forest companies. Others paid no heed, prompting environmental groups to organize a highly visible campaign including rallies at stores, blockades, shareholder resolutions, and advertisments in prominent media outlets in the United States and Europe.

Greenpeace led the work in Europe, hanging banners off German pulp-and-paper industry offices, blocking boat-loads of British Columbia wood from docking in Amsterdam, the United Kingdom, and Germany, and using protesters dressed up as Canadian Mounties against a backdrop of the Tower of London. With the help of major media outlets, the story grew.

In the United States, Rainforest Action Network targeted Home Depot, ForestEthics targeted Lowes and Staples, and the Natural Resources Defense Council took on DIYs. Protests in front of stores, New York Times ads, and municipal policies banning purchases of wood from the Great Bear Rainforest kept the controversy alive in both the media and the

boardrooms. On one occasion, protesters seized control of a Home Depot public-address system. "Endangered spirit-bear habitat on sale as two-byfours in aisle seven!" they told bewildered shoppers. Elsewhere the next day, environmental leaders in business suits appeared at shareholder meetings.

Scientists backed the campaign. The World Resources Institute published *Last Frontier Forests*, a report that mapped the global decline of old-growth forests. The report threw a spotlight on the Great Bear Rainforest as one of the last remaining stretches of undisturbed forest anywhere.

First Nations leaders met with company representatives and journalists in Europe and the United States. Groups toured with thousand-year-old stumps

"Groups toured with thousand-year-old stumps to illustrate what was at stake."

to illustrate what was at stake. Reporters ate up the story, and the media ran with full-colour images of the rainforests, the clearcuts, and the region's indigenous communities. Thousands of people joined the cause.

The provincial government and industry initially responded with a high-profile campaign designed to highlight new forest-practices laws, land-use planning regulations, and natural resource management schemes that claimed to protect all values. Senior politicians and forestry executives toured Europe and attended U.S. customer briefings, highlighting the progressive steps that they were taking to protect British Columbia's forests. Environmentalists and First Nation activists dogged them at every stop.

As the markets campaign raised the region's profile in boardrooms around the world, Canadian groups such as the Sierra Club of Canada's British Columbia chapter, the Raincoast Conservation Society and others were doing likewise with their respective supporters. For the forest companies, a public-relations challenge had exploded into a customer-relations debacle.

MEANWHILE, BACK IN THE BOARD-ROOM...

In 1999, a number of senior forest-company representatives assembled with their advisors to discuss their approach to the coastal conflict. During the meetings, the executives came to accept that environmental protection had come to represent a core social value that was in turn influencing purchasing decisions. Their customers were demanding that they take steps to resolve the conflicts in the woods.

The discussions began a process through which forest companies came to recognize that the Great Bear Rainforest had become the focal point of growing public and scientific concern over old-growth forests, and that forest companies and environmental groups alike must be accountable to the marketplace.

The forest industry's internal dialogue included representatives from Canadian Forest Products, Catalyst Paper, International Forest Products and Western Forest Products. The companies agreed to work together to reduce and ultimately eliminate conflict over coastal logging. The commitments demanded a sea change in the industry's relationship with environmental groups, a more strategic approach to land-use planning, and renewed efforts to work with First Nations, local communities and other stakeholders. It also meant radically restructuring their conventional approach to tenure management. Companies would have to see timber production not as the prime management objective, but as an outcome of planning for the full range of forest values.

To get there, the companies knew they'd have to sit down with the environmental groups they had battled for so long, and seek a negotiated resolution to the War in the Woods.




AND IN ANOTHER BOARD ROOM....

The environmental groups running market campaigns realized that they needed to come together and sit down with the forestry and paper companies. Greenpeace, ForestEthics, Rainforest Action Network, and the British Columbia chapter of the Sierra Club of Canada wanted to equip themselves with the skills and the resources they would need to engage with the logging companies. Home Depot, Lowes, the German pulp and paper industry and others had either cancelled contracts with British Columbia logging companies, or had sent them a clear message that things needed to change. Collectively, these firms represented more than a billion dollars of business for the industry each year. With that kind of leverage behind us, we knew we could negotiate for more than just a few valleys; we wanted to protect the ecology and transform the economy.



We knew that if we were to make the jump beyond simple campaigning, we needed dedicated scientists, foresters, economists and negotiating advisors. We formed an alliance called the Rainforest Solutions Project, hired staff and sought the resources we would need to to help us simultaneously campaign, negotiate and design the solutions.









getting to the table

By the end of the 1990s, the remote Great Bear Rainforest was becoming a crowded space. More than a dozen First Nations lived in the region, a half-dozen major logging companies operated there, and those companies in turn served a collection of major pulp companies that depended on their wood chips. Meanwhile, a dozen-odd environmental groups were running a local or international campaign focused on the area. And while all these players had a stake in the region, many of them were not speaking with one other. By the turn of the millenium, the conflict had grown so hot that all parties knew something had to give.

THE JOINT SOLUTIONS PROJECT

By 1999, the extended conflict had not only entrenched antagonism between forest companies and conservation groups, it had created personal animosities. When both sides came together to try to resolve differences, the meetings tended to be brief and hostile. They typically ended when one party or the other stormed from the room.

Pressure from forest-products buyers helped shift this dynamic. The buyers made it clear to the companies that they had to find a resolution, and they made it clear to conservation groups that we had to be part of this effort, too. If we couldn't produce a viable alternative to industrial logging, then the market for forest products would return to the status quo.

The stakes were high enough to force us to return to the table. The forest companies formed an alliance called the Coast Forest Conservation Initiative, and empowered its representatives to negotiate with conservation groups. Likewise, the conservation groups ForestEthics, Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network and the Sierra Club of British Columbia formed the Rainforest Solutions Project coalition, and prepared to negotiate with the companies.

In 2000, the Coast Forest Conservation Initiative companies agreed to halt development in more than 100 intact watersheds in the Great Bear Rainforest. In return, ForestEthics,

continued on page 20

Greenpeace, and Rainforest Action Network suspended the most aggressive elements of their market campaigns. Instead of asking customers to cancel contracts, conservation groups would keep customers updated on progress at the negotiating table. This "standstill" created the conditions for a new beginning between the parties.

Following the standstill agreement, the Coast Forest Conservation Initiative and the Rainforest Solutions Project agreed to form a bilateral working group called the Joint Solutions Project. It enabled communications and negotiations, and facilitated a broader dialogue with First Nations, the British Columbia government, labour groups and local communities. The group also proved a venue for information sharing, problem solving, and discussions of new policy and regulatory models that could be carried forward to the landuse planning and decision-making processes.

Through the Joint Solutions Project, two traditionally opposing players began hammering out their differences before they entered the room with other sectors and governments. They pooled their energy and resources to define new approaches and solutions. It was a step forward.



By the end of 2000, the mood in the Great Bear Rainforest had shifted considerably. Forestry companies had placed a moratorium on logging in key areas, and the parties had created three venues for constructive dialogue: the Joint Solutions Project, the Coastal First Nations, and the Land and Resource Management Planning tables. Tensions lingered, but people were talking about new ideas. The potential for creating something truly revolutionary grew palpable.

















COASTAL FIRST NATIONS TURNING POINT INITIATIVE

As forest companies and environmental groups coalesced and readied themselves for change, so too did the region's First Nations. For many years, coastal First Nation communities worked in isolation from one another. This changed in 2000, when leaders from First Nations communities throughout the Great Bear Rainforest gathered for the first time to discuss their shared challenges of high unemployment, lack of economic opportunities and lack of access to resources.

From the outset, the First Nations sought to restore ecologically, socially and economically sustainable land, water and resource management on the central and north coasts and Haida Gwaii. They wanted economic development, but they also wanted to protect the regional ecosystems and their quality of life.



They agreed they needed to work together to increase economic development opportunities and create more jobs for First Nations people and others. To accomplish this goal, the First Nations leaders formed a new alliance called the Turning Point Initiative that would later be renamed simply the Coastal First Nations. Coastal First Nations' strategic approach to development includes:

- sustainable ecosystem-based management of marine and land resources;
- increased local control and management of forestry and fisheries operations;
- coordinated development through regional strategic planning in forestry, fisheries and tourism with an emphasis on value added initiatives:
- partnerships and cooperative arrangements between governments, industry, environmental non-government organizations and other stakeholder groups;
- government-to-government relationships;
 and
- stronger governance institutions.

The Coastal First Nations alliance includes the Wuikinuxv Nation, Heiltsuk, Kitasoo/Xaixais, Gitga'at, Haisla, Metlakatla, Old Massett, Skidegate, and Council of the Haida Nation.

In the southern region of the Central Coast,
First Nations leaders established the Nanwakolas Council representing Namgis First Nation,
Mamalilikulla-Qwe-Qwa Sot'Em First Nation,
Tlowitsis First Nation, Da'naxda'xw First Nation,
Gwa'sala Nakwaxda'xw First Nation, Kwiakah
First Nation and Comox First Nation.





shifting philosophy: agreeing on a framework

As conservation groups, First Nations, industry, government agencies, and others began discussions in earnest, we each contributed ideas based on our own experiences. We brought lessons from conflicts and solutions in Haida Gwaii and Clayoquot Sound, as well as interim-measures negotiations, litigation, and other land-use planning processes. This assessment of what worked, and what hadn't, led us to set out a new approach and philosophy.

In 2001, we all took our first tangible step. The Joint Solutions Project and Coastal First Nations, along with other First Nations and stakeholders, agreed to a new framework for resolving the long-simmering resource conflicts. Faced with a united message from First Nations, environmental groups, and the forest industry, the government land-use planning tables also adopted this five-part framework agreement:

1.Strategic deferrals/moratoriums

All parties agreed it was important to maintain future management options while the land-use dialogues proceeded. To achieve this, we agreed to defer logging in the region's 100 intact valleys and other key ecological areas.

2. Independent Science

All parties agreed that land-use decisions of such magnitude demanded the best available science,

and that an independent team should provide it. We established the Coast Information Team to conduct biophysical and socio-economic research and advise the planning tables.

"All parties agreed that land-use decisions of such magnitude demanded the best available science."

3. Ecosystem-based Management Principles and Goals

All parties agreed to move beyond conventional logging and embrace a new approach called Ecosystem Based Management, or EBM. The approach recognizes that healthy and functioning ecosystems sustain communities, economies and cultures. Rather than focusing on what resources

to extract, Ecosystem-Based Management focuses first on the values that must be maintained in order to sustain healthy ecosystems. (For agreed-upon EBM principles, see Appendix 1).

4. Commitment to a New Economy

All parties agreed that the Great Bear Rainforest's economy would need to be diversified beyond its current reliance on natural-resource extraction. To facilitate this transition, we established a \$35 million financial package to assist workers and contractors impacted by logging deferrals and related land-use changes. Additionally, First Nations, environmental groups and the provincial government agreed to begin discussing a new idea that had never been pursued in Canada: attracting new financial capital

to support the protection of biodiversity and the creation of healthy communities.

5. Government-to-Government Agreement

As part of the 2001 agreements, the Province of British Columbia signed a government-to-government protocol agreement with the eight Coastal First Nations. The General Protocol Agreement on Land Use and Interim Measures provided for First Nations land-use planning processes to occur concurrently with the government-initiated planning processes. With these First Nations land use plans in place, the parties agreed that government-to-government negotiations would reconcile the province's land-use plans with those of the individual First Nations.

THE COAST INFORMATION TEAM

The parties together established the Coast Information Team, or CIT, to contribute independent scientific expertise to the development of ecosystem-based management practices on the north and central coast regions of British Columbia. Between 2002 and 2004, the CIT collected and compiled scientific, traditional, and local knowledge. Along the way, the team developed a number of principles, analyses and guidebooks to provide information and direction on management practices that can maintain ecosystem integrity while improving human well-being. CIT products include:

 Background documents establishing scientific rationale for ecosystem-based management in coastal rainforests;

- Ecosystem, cultural, and economic-gain spatial analyses;
- Ecosystem-based management handbooks and planning guides;
- Management reports including a review of the CIT's own process and structure

Of the CIT's \$3.3 million budget, the province contributed 58 percent, conservation groups and forest companies each contributed 18 percent, while the government of Canada contributed 6 percent. For the structure of the CIT, see Appendix 4.

More information, including all CIT products, is available at http://archive.ilmb.gov.bc.ca/citbc











from framework to solution: 2001-2006

The 2001 framework agreement-in-principle proved a significant step. But everyone involved recognized that it would take a great deal of work to turn an agreement into a substantive plan that would in turn lead to a new reality on the ground. In fact, it would take five years, more than a dozen committees and literally thousands of hours of meetings. Here are a few of the negotiations we worked through behind the scenes:

Rethinking protection

There was never any question that permanent ecological protection would be a fundamental component of any solution. However, as the parties examined practical tools for achieving protection, it became clear that no existing legislation would meet all of our needs. First Nations needed assurances that their traditional uses and cultural values would be respected and protected, and that natural resources would continue to support their cultural and economic needs. Environmental groups needed confirmation that ecological values would take precedence over recreational developments within the protected areas.

Existing provincial legislation, however, provided only for the establishment of various classes of parks that did not fulfill either of these objectives. We responded by creating new legislation. First Nations and conservation groups worked with the province to develop a new "conservancy" designa-

tion that provides for First Nations uses, and that establishes ecological values as primary conservation objectives.

"Coastal First Nations tested new business concepts, such as shellfish aquaculture and nontimber forest products."

Rethinking the environment/economy divide

For many years, environmental groups insisted that conservation could promote economic diversification and deliver benefits to communities. During the Great Bear negotiations, First Nations and others challenged us to prove it.

In response, the groups proposed a new initiative to build conservation financing capital—that is, private funding to support conservation-related activities and businesses. Environmental groups

worked with The Nature Conservancy and the Tides Canada Foundation to raise CAD\$60 million in funding from foundations and private donors, with the hope that public agencies would match the contributions. As the effort gained momentum, First Nations, the British Columbia government, environmental groups and the forest industry worked together to explore possible legal and practical frameworks for their investment. (For a brief on the Conservation Investment and Incentives Initiative see Appendix 3.)

Conservation financing meant more than simply injecting money into the local economy—an approach that had been tried, unsuccessfully, in the past. Instead it linked new investments with clear and lasting conservation commitments. These new investments were designed to support innovative and sustainable new businesses, and increased conservation-management capacity in First Nations communities. To test new ideas during the negotiations, Coastal First Nations ran research and pilot projects in ecosystem-based forestry, and tested new business concepts such as shellfish aquaculture and non-timber forest products.

Integrating science, knowledge, and planning processes

Through years of intensive public planning processes, the stakeholders at the regional Land

and Resource Management Planning table developed land-use plans along with a suite of measures designed to protect ecosystems and regional economies. Meanwhile, the First Nations worked within their communities, gathering traditional knowledge and combining it with western science and planning tools to develop land-use plans for its traditional territories. The Coast Information Team supported both planning processes.

Behind the scenes, the Joint Solutions Project and Coastal First Nations worked individually and together to develop innovative models and ideas that could lower barriers and move all of the negotiations forward towards an overall solution. In 2004, the stakeholders involved in the regional planning tables reached consensus on their preferred plans for the central and north coast regions. The parties then subjected the results to more than a year of government-to-government negotiations between First Nations and the Government of British Columbia.

Finally, in February 2006, representatives of First Nations, conservation groups, forest companies, the British Columbia government, and philanthropic foundations came together to announce and celebrate their agreement on a comprehensive solution for the Great Bear Rainforest.













The agreement protects a network of ecologically and culturally significant areas that represent the full range of habitat types within the Great Bear Rainforest. They secure habitat for sensitive native plants and animals and safeguard many of the region's most productive salmon streams, unique natural features and irreplaceable cultural sites.

In total, the protected-area network encompasses 21,120 square kilometers, or 8,150 square miles—approximately one third of the region's total area. The network includes many of the watersheds covered by the original moratorium. Together, the protected areas comprise:

- 55 percent of estuaries;
- 54 percent of wetlands;
- 40 percent of known salmon-bearing streams;
- 30 percent of all habitat for key species such as northern goshawks, marbled murrelets and grizzly bears; and
- 34 percent of old-growth forests and 39 percent of mature forest.

New provincial legislation legally designates these areas as conservancies that are co-managed by First Nations and provincial agencies.





The Great Bear Rainforest's network of protected areas is just one part of an overall commitment to maintaining the region's ecosystems. The other key element is ecosystem-based management—a new approach to forest practices that comprises the following multi-scale ecosystem-based management framework:

- At the regional and landscape scales, the protectedarea network and old-growth reserves safeguard a core of ecologically and culturally significant areas.
 These provide the most secure habitat for sensitive native plants and animals, and protect salmon streams, natural features, and cultural sites.
- At the landscape and watershed scale—for example, a watershed greater than 10,000 hectares, or 20,000 acres—management plans assign high, medium, or low risk to ecosystem integrity, resulting in reserves where little or no resource extraction takes place.
 These reserves maintain wildlife habitat and migration corridors, protect waterways, and preserve specific values such as threatened species, sensitive soils, and cultural, scenic and recreation areas.
- At the site scale—such as within a 100-hectare, or 250-acre, forest stand—harvesters must retain between 15 and 70 percent of the trees to maintain key habitat features such as streamside cover, trees for nesting, rare plants or den sites. Logging plans also seek to support natural processes. For example, by leaving large fallen trees in rivers, loggers can contribute to salmon habitat.

Ecosystem-based management lessens the overall risk to biodiversity and ecological health across the region. The framework prioritizes economic and community objectives in areas that can best sustain them, and reserves greater environmental protections for more sensitive areas. Further, EBM matches ecosystem-based management plans with socio-economic strategies that generate income, enhance cultural and comunnity health, and support sustainable livelihoods. In this way, the approach blends conservation and community stability at a regional scale.

In 2009, the Province of British Columbia formally encoded EBM practices in legislation and regulations to provide a legally-binding forest management framework for the Great Bear Rainforest.









All told, environmental groups, First Nations, and others raised CAD\$60 million in donations from foundations and individuals, which in turn leveraged a matching contribution from the Government of Canada and Province of British Columbia.

The public and private donors created a pair of funds called the Coast Opportunity Funds (Coast Funds). Of these two funds, the first—a permanent endowment—supports efforts to maintain the Great Bear Rainforest's ecological health. The second, shorter-term fund creates sustainable businesses and jobs. (See Coast Opportunity Funds structure – Appendix 6.)

The Coast Funds differ from many other conservation and economic-development funds in a number of key respects:

- The funds share a common vision and operate together while maintaining each fund's specific mission.
- · Awards from both funds must support activities and

businesses consistent with EBM principles and the EBM management framework.

- Only those First Nations that commit to significant conservation elements in their land-use plans will benefit from the plan. The more traditional territory they place under protection, the greater their allocation.
- Each fund reserves CAD\$2 million for groups such as Coastal First Nations and Nanwakolas Council to support ongoing regional planning and regional-capacity building among member nations.

Coast Funds began issuing awards in October of 2008, and the organization now plays a key role by helping each First Nation to utilize its funding allocation to achieve its long-term goals. As of June 2010, Coast Funds had awarded more than CAD\$11 million, of which CAD\$3.3 million went to conservation and CAD\$7.8 million went to economic development. Conservation awards have ranged from salmon-monitoring efforts, to the launch of the Coast Guardian Watchmen Network, a First Nations stewardship patrol, to general support for integrated resource stewardship

programs. Economic development awards have largely invested in the aquaculture, tourism, and forestry sectors and have helped establish economic development corporations.

All involved parties continue to learn how best to operate the funds, as well as what is required to realize the long-term vision for the Great Bear Rainforest. Coast Funds will continue to strive to respond to these needs, and has recently committed to developing a capacity-strengthening strategy that will better position coastal communities and nations to take full advantage of their Coast Funds allocation and related opportunities.

BUILDING FIRST NATIONS CAPACITY:

The Great Bear Training Institute

A conservation-based economy on the central and north coasts can only succeed with the active and meaningful participation of First Nations communities. To ensure that community members have the skills and training they need to take advantage of new economic opportunities, the Coastal First Nations established the Great Bear Training Institute. The virtual school works with existing training and education institutions to identify labourmarket opportunities, mark trends and anticipate future opportunities, and develop tailored training programs that prepare First Nations members for these opportunities.





The Great Bear Rainforest Agreement includes new structures to sustain the governmentto-government commitments and to support ongoing cooperative resource management in the region. It includes the following elements.

 The First Nations and the Province of British Columbia together established a series of Land and Resource Forums to oversee the implementation of the land-use plans and ecosystem-based management practices in the Great Bear Rainforest. A Joint Land and Resource Forum focuses on issues that encompass the entire region, while separate forum tables manage issues unique to individual regions. These venues support ongoing information-sharing and cooperative management.

The Joint Land and Resource Forum oversees the work
 of the EBM Working Group, a multi-party body set up to
 support the ongoing development and implementation
 of EBM in the region. First Nations and the provincial
 government co-chair the group, which also includes representatives from conservation groups, forest companies,
 local communities, and regional economic interests. It
 oversees technical and scientific work, identifies research
 priorities, and makes policy and management recommendations to the province and the First Nations.

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE AGREEMENTS


The Great Bear Rainforest did not emerge overnight; it was the end result of a significant and sustained outpouring of passion and rigour. For this reason, when the time came to implement the agreement, the parties elected to pursue a variety of formal institutions in lieu of voluntary mechanisms. They created the Land and Resources Forum and the Coast Opportunities Fund, with mandates to guide or implement components of the agreement. They also embedded goals and process requirements into the terms of ongoing relationships among govern-

ments. Finally, they created new legislation and regulations to bind the agreements and ensure they will stand the test of time.

CREATING A NEW ECONOMY

The ultimate test of the agreements will be whether a new, sustainable economy emerges on the British Columbia coast. This will be a slow process, but plans are currently underway in some communities for shellfish aquaculture, high-end lodge tourism, new forestry operations, and some non-timber forest products.

HOW IT ALL FITS TOGETHER



Great Bear Rainforest - Timeline		
1993	A series of forest conflicts up and down the coast of British Columbia culminates in the arrest of close to 1,000 protesters at Clayoquot Sound on the West Coast of Vancouver Island.	
1996	Environmental organizations launch the Great Bear Rainforest campaign in the markets of Canada, Europe, and United States in an effort to protect the 64,000-square-kilometer coastal ecosytem.	
400=	The British Columbia government implements a forest-practices code to govern all public-land forest practices.	
1997	The Province of British Columbia launches a comprehensive Central Coast land- and resource-planning process. Environmental groups refuse to participate unless and until the government defers logging in all undeveloped watersheds during the discussions.	
4000	A delegation of German paper and magazine-publishing executives tours the Great Bear Rainforest. The group meets with environmental organizations, provincial representatives and industry officials, and challenges them to work together to resolve the conflict.	
1999	The Home Depot announces a global corporate policy change to end sales of forest products from "endangered areas." Lowe's and other major wood buyers follow suit with similar announcements.	
	Five British Columbia forest products companies create the Coast Forest Conservation Initiative.	
	Greenpeace, the Rainforest Action Network, Natural Resources Defense Council, ForestEthics and the Sierra Club come together to speak with a single voice. The groups call their coalition the Rainforest Solutions Project.	
2000	Coastal Forest Conservation Initiative companies and the Rainforest Solutions Project reach a milestone when both sides "stand down" their activities while discussions proceed. The companies agree to defer logging in intact areas of the Great Bear Rainforest, and the environmental groups agree to suspend their market campaigns.	
	Responding to the agreements between industry and environmental groups, an alliance of coastal community mayors launch Operation Defend.	
	A mediated agreement formally establishes the Joint Solutions Project.	
	All Coastal First Nations meet for the first time to discuss coastal logging impacts and create a formal alliance to work together to change legislation and government referral processes.	
	The province and Coastal First Nations together ratify the first phase of the Central Coast process and ratify a landmark protocol.	
2001	Joint Solutions Project companies, the Rainforest Solutions Project groups, and other stakeholders negotiate an interim land-use agreement for the central coast. The deal includes a set of protected-areas recommendations, further planning, development of an ecosystem-based management approach, and continued time-limited logging deferrals.	
	First Nations land-use planning processes begin.	
	Kitasoo Gitga'at First Nation sign a protocol with environmental groups, forest companies and tourism operators, and begin piloting ecosystem-based management, land-use plans, new economic development opportunities, and conservation financing.	

2002	The Province of British Columbia, foundations, First Nations, and environmental groups create the Conservation Investments and Incentives Initiative to explore the idea of conservation financing. The program would eventually create the Coast Opportunity Funds.
2003- 2004	The Central Coast and North Coast planning processes wrap up and share their conclusions with government-to-government negotiations between individual First Nations and the province.
2005	The Park Act is amended to create a new form of protected area called the conservancy. The designation is reserved for those lands set aside primarily for First Nations social, ceremonial and cultural uses.
	After 18 months of negotiations, government-to-government discussions lead to agreements between the province and sixteen First Nations.
2006	The province ratifies land-use plans that remain materially consistent with the recommendations from the public planning processes. The plans include almost five million acres—two million hectares—of protected area.
	The province, First Nations and stakeholders agree to implement the plans and ecosystem-based management program by March 31, 2009.
2006-	Through government-to-government deliberations and stakeholder consultations, players develop an initial suite of legal requirements needed to implement ecosystem-based management. They also implement elements of the coastal agreements.
2008	The government legally designates protected areas recommended by the planning process and government-to-government process.
	The \$120 million Coast Opportunities Funds are established to assist the region's First Nations communities with economic development. Environmental groups, First Nations, foundations, and governments together raised the funds.
2007	The groups establish the Ecosystem Based Management Working Group to help best implement new forest management practices.
	The World Wildlife Fund awards its prestigious Gift to the Earth prize to the province, environmental organizations, Coast Forest Conservation Initiative, and First Nations in recognition of collective conservation efforts.
	The Coast Land Use Decision and ecosystem-based-management are implemented.
2008	Three forest businesses operating in the Central Coast seek Forest Stewardship Council certification for the Mid Coast Timber Supply Area.
2008- 2014	The ongoing effort and collaboration between all parties creates a region that supports both a high degree of human well-being and a low risk to natural ecosystems.



PART II-Lessons

At various points during the Great Bear Rainforest negotiations, conservation groups prepared strategic plans detailing various streams of work and associated objectives. The narrative invariably included a footnote disclaimer offering some variant of the following: "In reality, the activities and strategies presented here are highly iterative and interdependent." The same caveat applies to any effort to categorize the lessons learned through the campaign. Each of the seven takeaways presented on the pages that follow reflects an essential element of our effort, and each is also meaningless in isolation. Like any healthy system, each lesson contains elements of every other.

Our aim in sharing these lessons is not to help other groups replicate the Great Bear Rainforest model in other places. Our victory emerged from an unique set of ecological, social, economic, and political circumstances. It was also the culmination of decades of forest campaigning in British Columbia and around the world. It will not happen anywhere else. What could—and, indeed, must—happen elsewhere is an increase in powerful advocacy move-

ments and creative solution-building. By sharing our lessons from the Great Bear, we are offering a glimpse inside the process of whole-system transformation. This section will go into considerable detail about the lessons learned, and share comments, stories, and perspectives from a wide variety of individuals involved over the decade of Great Bear work.

- Lesson 1. **BE BOLD:** Paint a compelling vision of change
- Lesson 2. **BUILD POWER:** Real change requires real influence
- Lesson 3. **CREATE COALITIONS:** Find strength in numbers
- Lesson 4. **BUILD COMMON GROUND:** Create alliances of 'strange bedfellows'
- Lesson 5. **BE PROACTIVE:** Design and drive the solutions
- Lesson 6. PRACTICE HUMILITY: Lose your ego
- Lesson 7. **STAY POSITIVE:** Persistent optimism is infectious

"The Great Bear
Rainforest effort
wasn't a campaign.
It was a plan, a
roadmap, a solution. This is the only
reason it could win.
A campaign can't
solve complexity—and this was a
complex problem."
Ross McMillan Advisor

Ross McMillan, Advisor to philanthropic foundations

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We gave a lot of funding to this-it was a high-risk, highreturn project. It was the vision, that was what made it possible. It made us do things outside of our normal processes and outside of our norms to get the support within the foundation that was needed. We could see the vision—we could see that it was transformational—and how conservation and social justice and economic well-being could really happen on a larger scale. On a scale that really mattered ecologically.

—Scott Rehmus, then with The David and Lucille Packard Foundation



BE BOLD: Paint a compelling vision of change.

Effective advocacy begins with a clear description of a future that others wish to share. When people ask how we did what we did, our answer invariably begins with the vision. The Great Bear Rainforest campaign succeeded because it was guided by a shared desire to create a global model of conservation that could address ecosystem health, resource use, and community well-being—all at the same time.

This is easy enough to say, and indeed conservation groups say things much like it all the time. Advocacy organizations routinely set out visions for their work—often in terms that emphasize transformation, broad solutions, and global models. But not all of these visions are effective. Part of the problem stems from confusing the vision with a position, a demand set, or a communications strategy. Through our work on the Great Bear Rainforest, we learned some important distinctions:

- A vision is more than an "ask." The ask in a campaign is one step in a series that mark progress towards a vision, but it is not the vision itself. A clearly-defined ask is an essential component of any negotiation process, but when it comes to galvanizing change or mobilizing supporters, it often has little or no value.
- A vision is more than a brand. Much has been made of the fact that, early in the campaign, conservation groups successfully rebranded a region formerly called the "Midcoast Timber Supply Area" as the "Great Bear Rainforest." It is true that this move captured public attention and conveyed the vastness, uniqueness

and majesty of the region's towering trees and white bears. However, on its own this would still have been of limited value in mobilizing change.

Conservation groups began by demanding the protection of more than 100 intact watersheds in the newly-branded Great Bear Rainforest. Our initial vision did not go much further. As we listened to other important players, including First Nations, government, industry, and local communities, we realized that it was possible—and, indeed, essential—to broaden our horizons. As a result, we expanded our vision to encompass economic and social elements as well as ecosystem protection.

Throughout the campaign, we made sure that this vision was always presented as a whole. It served as a basis for all of our actions, discussions, and communications. To bring this future to life, we could 'paint' a picture of it using images, stories, and facts. The vision served to inspire the environmental groups, First Nations, companies and governments, and helped build public support for challenging the status quo. Critically, it also shifted our






Some of the environmental leaders did a lot of work to persuade others around the vision. They created momentum around it, it was inescapable, it was going to happen. And this is what brought people on board. Those with vision brought others in.

Patrick Armstrong, consultant to the logging companies

People from each sector saw the art of the possible and understood the vision. Once we had so many people from diverse perspectives who embraced the vision, real momentum occurred.

-Ross McMillan







role as environmental organizations from "special interest groups" with a limited set of objectives, to advocates for a broader movement that offered space for everyone.

Through the years of this campaign, we learned a number of lessons that helped us to define and communicate our vision in compelling ways:

- Be inclusive. At the beginning, conservation groups wanted only to protect intact watersheds. As we listened to First Nations, industry, and communities, we brought new elements into our vision. We added ecosystem-based management, to acknowledge the need for continued economic development, a trust fund for workers to respond to the concerns of individuals and families, and conservation investments to smooth the transition to a new economic model. These elements made it possible for forest companies, local communities, workers, and First Nations to see themselved in the final picture. The broader vision became the foundation for a shared effort.
- Be different. Our vision began with what was at the time an unfamiliar assertion—that conservation and economic development need not be mutually exclusive. Prior to the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, the British Columbia conservation debate revolved around the challenge of balancing jobs with the

- environment. Our vision attracted attention because it claimed a completely different conversation was possible.
- Paint pictures. Our vision was not padded with abstract terms such as "sustainability," nor itemized with long lists of facts. We expressed it in maps, images, and in pilot projects that demonstrated real work on the ground. The point of articulating a vision is to help people to see where they are going—if it isn't communicated in visual terms, it isn't a vision.
- Get personal. By drawing on the cultural and spiritual significance of the region and the rainforest, as well as the pride of local communities, workers, residents, and citizens, we were able to appeal to individuals. These emotional connections deepened commitment to our vision.
- Make it big. Our vision was nothing less than a complete transformation of resource management practices over an area of land almost three times the size of Vancouver Island. It was a big, bold proposal—but because of its inclusiveness and its ability to engage both individuals and organizations, it served to inspire and to motivate supporters rather than to frighten them off. Over time, the sheer scale of the initiative became a distinct component of the vision; the fact that we could lead the world in a large-scale model of sustainability became an added incentive for all of us.

It is hard to sell a two-by-four with a protester hanging off of it.

-Bill Dumont, then Chief Forester, **Western Forest Products** Brussels, 1998

Companies had refused to talk to us. They told us we were crazy and were running ads against us. We were saying, "you have to stop logging in pristine valleys." They were saying, "You'll wreck the economy."

The Belgian Paper Association had invited the BC government, companies, and environmental groups to a meeting. We each gave presentations. I remember that the government and companies gave a very slick presentation with maps and brochures. They were very confident. After all of us had presented, the Belgian Paper association held a caucus while we waited. They came back and announced, "Today the Belgian Paper Industries are putting out a press release to announce that we will no longer buy paper from BC because of the logging of old growth from the west coast."

That meeting was a turning point for me. The government and industry had been so sure of their power, sure that they could marginalize the environmental groups. At that moment, I realized the tide was turning.

-Tzeporah Berman, then working with Greenpeace International

BUILD POWER: Real change requires real influence.

Early in the campaign, environmental groups recognized that our past tactics of obstruction and sustained media attention would prove ineffective in the Great Bear Rainforest. It was too big, remote, and difficult to access. Looking for a new strategy, we studied the forces influencing the future of the coast forest.

We found a complex power dynamic among three main players. Government had the power to make decisions about when, where, and how logging would happen. The forest industry had the power conferred by legal rights to log, significant social licence as major employers, and economic clout. First Nations, who have unresolved rights and title in British Columbia, were using litigation and negotiations to build their power as keepers of their traditional territories These three forces were sometimes aligned, and sometimes at odds with one another in varying combinations.


Recognizing that our strongest leverage would come from a demonstrated ability to affect the operating environment of the forest companies, environmental groups undertook a strategic assessment of the entire forest sector. We gathered information about the day-to-day work of forest companies, wood manufacturers, buyers, and consumers. We asked questions and researched the motivations, pressures, and decision-making processes of every player in the production chain.



Armed with this analysis, we took our protest to the marketplace. We blockaded shipments of wood from logging operations to manufacturers, asked manufacturers and distributors to cancel contracts, and targeted wholesale purchasers and end-use consumers through aggressive communications campaigns. These activities extended the impacts of the campaign all the way up the supply chain.











Some companies cancelled their contracts with British Columbia logging companies. More importantly, however, the campaign achieved its intended aim of affecting the operating conditions. It tied up senior management, forced companies to invest time and resources in defensive communications, and—when major buyers threatened to withdraw from contracts-created uncertainty about future revenues. The campaigns affected not only the brand of the targeted companies, but of British Columbian forest products more generally, tarnishing an entire sector by its association with environmental problems and conflict.


As the marketplace increasingly questioned the acceptability of British Columbia coastal forest products, the consumer pressure for solutions ultimately led forest companies to sit down with us to begin negotiating about our vision and asks. We had successfully established ourselves among the powerful players on the coast.

We soon learned, however, that this new found power was insufficient. The areas in question were the traditional territories of the First Nations who had effectively used the courts to prove that their title and rights had not been extinguished. They cared deeply about their

lands, waters and communities, and they were not about to cede authority to industry, government or environmental groups. And they were becoming more and more coordinated and effective in asserting this position.

This was not, however, the end of the power shifts that took place during the campaign. As First Nations and environmental groups exercised power, the dynamics of negotiation changed. For the first time, both had real alternatives to negotiations: First Nations had the courts, and environmental groups had the marketplace. Had we walked from the table, we could have done significant damage to the government, forest companies and potentially one other. The fact that all parties shared a true and urgent interest in arriving at a solution kept us all at the table and marked the beginning of real negotiations.

As the talks got underway, the environmental groups learned that creating a place at the table would not be enough. We needed to be thoughtful about how we used the power we had built. This also required a shift from relying on the power of coercion, to cultivating the power of relationship-building and collaboration. We may have forced our way to the table, but we sustained our place by demonstrating our willingness and ability to build bridges, work hard, be creative, and advance good solutions.



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The act of sitting down with the campaigners and coming to an agreement on a moratorium—that empowered the companies. They were doing something non-traditional and it was working. That also went for the environmental groups. By sitting down with business they gained power—they were also not doing the traditional thing. Environmentalists gained power by negotiating. Power isn't always dominance, it is influence.

 Patrick Armstrong, negotiator and advisor to the coastal logging companies

Power got us in the room but it didn't get us to the solution. Good ideas alone were also not sufficient. Personal relationships were needed, along with people's willingness to never give up on the vision. We shifted from using the power of conflict to using the power of relationships.

-Dr. Jody Holmes, Rainforest Solutions Project



LESSONS LEARNED

CREATE COALITIONS: Find strength in numbers.

One of the remarkable features of the Great Bear campaign was that each of the key players—conservation groups, First Nations, industry, and even funders—formed coalitions or consortiums. Each sector had its own reasons for doing so, but it was clear that this strategy helped each group develop a coordinated approach to the negotiations. It also meant that everyone at the negotiating table had the support of a broad constituency to move the dialogue forward.

For our groups—and, we suspect, for the companies and First Nations as well—a coalition offered a kind of safety net that we knew we would need as we entered unfamiliar territory. We wanted to ensure we were not going to be seen as isolated voices bringing forward unconventional ideas. There's safety in numbers; people and organizations are more likely to take risks if they have the support of colleagues.

In hindsight, the comprehensive and detailed negotiation and solutionbuilding process likely couldn't have taken place without the coalitions. The solution lay somewhere in the midst of all of the interests. At times there was a need for shuttle diplomacy between the coalitions, while other times there were constructive sessions between the different sectors-off-site brainstorming sessions, workshops in coastal communities, or convenings over dinner. Leaders emerged who could walk between the different coalitions. They came to meetings to put forward their coalition's ideas, and returned to their

groups to debate the pros and cons of moving forward in different ways based on what they had learned.

For the conservation groups, working in coalitions also offered several practical advantages:

- We were able to deliver strong and consistent messages to the public, our supporters, and our opponents.
- We had a united negotiating strategy and clear message when in negotiations and dialogues, which gave us more leverage and traction.
- We could pool our resources and share expertise, which increased our efficiency.
- We reduced overlaps in our efforts, which streamlined our work and diminished overlaps in our requests to funders.
- We kept all our allies informed and coordinated, so we could all work in the same direction.
- We challenged each other if we were 'stuck' and we kept each other motivated when things looked bleak.

Even so, being in a coalition is never easy. We struggled with the necessary




The work together became more of a movement—a symphony— where everyone had different roles to play to move the big solution forward.

It became like a multi-dimensional chess game where different ideas were being seeded and different relationships were being developed in order to make the whole thing move in one direction.

-Ross McMillan, then advisor to the philanthropic foundations







process and transaction costs-what one of our members aptly calls "the yuck of it all," the time spent in meetings, resolving arguments among members, or negotiating the details of every decision. We argued—sometimes politely, sometimes ferociously—over strategy, over money, and over profile.

The environmental groups in the negotiations-ForestEthics, Greenpeace and Sierra Club-formed a coalition called the Rainforest Solutions Project. It was designed to provide technical support and to be the "glue" that kept the groups working together. It had a secretariat with technical staff-a forester, biologist, economist and coordinator-who worked on behalf of the collective strategy.

Environmental Groups

Conflict

Foundations

The Rainforest Solutions table relied on a "war room" where the staff of the three groups working on the campaign came together with the coalition staff to develop strategy, negotiate positions, and plan next steps. Senior staff met

Logging Companies

weekly by phone to review the latest developments, solve problems, and

- develop short- and longterm responses. Through the Rainforest Solutions process we identified every relationship we needed
- to have in order to move the agenda forward, and assigned someone to develop that relationship—whether it was with a First Nations leader, industry player, or government rep. When things went sideways we had a communications team to help with media if that was our best tool, or, if direct communication was going to be more effective, we had someone on our team who could call up just about any chief, CEO, or government minister related to the file.

We developed a well-structured, disciplined team comprised of staff



from each of the three groups and the Rainforest Solutions Project coalition. We met regularly, refined our strategy quarterly, and were able to communicate effectively with the other players. The coalition approach does have its drawbacks, and chief among them was the loss of clear identity of each of the participating organizations, but the benefits of successfully transforming the debate and driving our conservation vision foward far outweighed that downside. (See appendix 5 for a more detailed diagram of the Rainforest Solutions Project coalition structure.)

At times coalitions broke down, with some groups leaving and then rejoining

later, or not at all. Conflict seems to be a reality of human organization. However, each coalition maintained sufficient members, with enough strength, to keep things moving forward. In the end, we learned many valuable insights. One important lesson: The vision has to be bigger than the "yuck." To any organization contemplating participating in a coalition, we would ask two questions:

- Do you need one another? Is the support of like-minded organizations essential to your success?
- Do you and your colleagues share a clear and compelling vision? Is it big enough to keep you wading through the mire of internal process,

and specific enough to articulate a distinct and measurable goal?

If the answer to either of these questions is "no," then a coalition is likely not the best vehicle for your work. If the answer is "yes," then you would do well to consider a thoughtful alliance. So long as the conditions are right, and everyone in the room is ready to pull in the same direction, then you may find that many minds are stronger than few.

LESSONS LEARNED

Informal discussions were key. They required people who had an aptitude for bridge building. They also created a place with smaller numbers of people, where there was a higher degree of comfort and security that you could 'try things on' without prejudice. More creative ideas could be discussed. And people realized that they could have an off the record conversation that would be respected. That created the space to be able to float ideas that you otherwise couldn't. It was the small, informal discussions outside and in advance of the real meetings that made things move.

 Dan Johnston, mediator between the logging companies and the environmental organizations

I walked in with certain chips on my shoulders which Dan (the mediator) and colleagues would try to remove as they were barriers to creating creative solutions. That was one of my learnings—to actually put them down to hear the concerns of the companies. And also with the First Nations—really hearing their concerns that needed to be addressed.

You need to develop relationships with people if you're trying to make solutions. It generally doesn't work to grind people into capitulation.

—Lisa Matthaus, then with the Sierra Club of British Columbia

SEEK COMMON GROUND: Build alliances of 'strange bedfellows'.


Environmental groups began the Great Bear Rainforest campaign believing that our work would involve winning a fight with forest companies and other opponents and ultimately protecting large tracts of land. This is, after all, how the conservation movement had largely defined itself over the course of generations. During this campaign, we came to see the limitations of this kind of thinking.

It became clear to us that a large-scale transformation would only succeed if there were no winners or losers. Asking government to choose one of several competing visions would be risky—and even in the unlikely event that the province endorsed "our" solution, a conservation victory would eventually be eroded or overturned if First Nations, companies, workers, or communities did not support it. Somehow we needed to build a solution that all the parties would support and uphold.

We reached the turning point when individuals—whether from First Nations, environmental groups, or forest companies—began actually listening to one another, instead of viewing meetings simply as opportunities to state demands.

There are two parts to this responsibility for listening. Each person speaking must be ready to articulate his or her interests or needs, rather than demands, and each person listening must seek to understand and empathise with the





unique perspective being expressed. As we learned to listen and validate one another's views, we all became more willing to expand our respective visions of change.

Eventually, three traditional adversaries—environmental groups, First Nations, and logging companies—built a solution that reflected all the values and interests at the table. This was extremely powerful: When we united around a single proposal, the government had little choice but to accept and implement our shared solutions package.

It is undeniably risky to sit down with one's opponents. This period of building alliances across sectors proved challenging in many respects. However, creating a revolutionary new conservation plan required an equally radical planning and negotiation process. In the end, this approach was central to our success. For conservation groups, our experience highlights several lessons:

 Be creative. The more complex and entrenched the system, the more creativity and innovation you will need to change it. As we listened more to the perspectives of others, we also adopted a problem-solving rather than confrontational approach. When people said "no" to our ideas, we worked with them to come up with new and better ones. Instead of getting stuck when the existing options couldn't resolve the conflict, we worked to "expand the

pie" and find the new things that parties wanted or needed to increase the range of options. Together we invented new tools such as the conservancy legislation and conservation financing, and new processes such as the Coast Information Team and ecosystem-based management to address concerns as they emerged.

 Get out of your box. It was not easy for us to look beyond full protection of the rainforest, and to talk seriously about where and how logging would take place. Similarly, it was difficult to talk about new kinds of protected areas that would allow certain economic activities. We needed to get out of our conventional environmentalist stance before we could build shared solutions and expand our vision. More importantly, we needed to lose the attitude of righteousness that might have kept us from seeing other parties' concerns as valid. We found that we could maintain a high bar for environmental concerns and find ways to address other interests.





- Build relationships with people, not with organizations. Institutions don't make change; people do. New ideas only get into organizations when individuals bring them in. While it was important to understand the collective perspective of broad sectors such as the forest industry and First Nations, the true relationship-building and trust developed at a personal level. As individual leaders became committed to the emerging shared solution, they worked to build the support of their sectors. One practical way we learned to focus on individuals rather than organizations was to hold our meetings outside of boardrooms whenever we could.
- Invest in shared research and projects. On more than one occasion, we resolved potential snags by retaining independent experts to offer advice, undertaking shared fact-finding initiatives or pilot projects, and using the results to inform new perspectives. In these cases, the experience of doing the work together

proved just as valuable as the results.

• Be patient, and get good help.

Once we realized the power of a diverse alliance, we worked hard to bring conflicting and unusual partners to the table. The involvement of professional mediators and facilitators made possible many conversations that would otherwise never have happened. The effort required a great deal of investment in building relationships, aligning values, and finding new stories that could encompass different perspectives. The result was unbeatable.

In the end, representatives of First
Nations, the British Columbia government, environmental groups, and forest
companies all shared the stage, and each
of us spoke with pride about our unprecedented accomplishment. Our shared
effort illustrates the power of moving from
sectoral advocacy to co-creation: more
than anything else, the shared sense of
ownership among diverse players will
sustain our success through time.

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Some people were alienated or threatened by the idea of these strange bedfellows coming together. To others, this was a big part of the appeal. It caused people to sit up and take notice. It was a huge reason why the private funders were involved—because the conservation groups had the moxy to sit down and work out a vision and solution with industry. Even government was attracted to the idea of the strange bedfellows coming together.

-Ross McMillan, advisor to philanthropic foundations

Individuals in each of the sectors played a leadership role and were willing to walk into the other rooms, talk it through and understand the different world views. The shuttle diplomats took their message back and forth between the parties to figure out where the common ground was.

—Scott Rehmus, then with the David and Lucille Packard Foundation

It is all about people. You solve by people, not by policies. So, you have to have the right people to deal with a complex situation. And, the people themselves transformed through the process, depending on their openness and ability to adapt to changes.

-Doug Konkin, Deputy Minister of Forests

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Before I got involved, I asked, what are the rules of the game? And I realized, we can't solve this with those rules. We need to wipe the slate clean, with minimal rules, and go back to principles. That was when the government said 'We need to solve this, and we're willing to waive the standardized policies and processes, to start looking for new solutions'— at that point, we were in fact just catching up to what had already happened on the private side.

—Doug Konkin, British Columbia Ministry of Forests

Science ended up being a key tool early on. It was a way to start people collaborating. No one can argue against decisions being made with good science information. This helped create the space for a discussion that couldn't happen otherwise. For any party to say 'we're not interested in sitting down to discuss the best science and who should do it', it wouldn't have been acceptable to civil society.

—Dan Johnston, mediator between the logging companies and the environmental groups

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BE PROACTIVE: Design and drive the solutions you want.

Once we found ourselves in active negotiations, we quickly concluded that our "ask"—protection for the Great Bear—was not in itself a solution to the complex socio-economic, cultural, and ecological dynamics unfolding in the region. This marked a turning point for the environmental groups. We began to consider how we might move from running a campaign to designing and co-creating a solution.

Initially, we'd been told to play by the rules. But as the power dynamics shifted, we all came to see that the familiar conventions—the existing policies, processes and programs—could not take us to a new future. So we worked together to invent new paths forward. Rather than using our power to continue to demand a specific outcome, we used it to press for new initiatives that firmly entrenched conservation objectives, but that also engaged multiple parties in a search for lasting solutions.

Once the Coast Information Team and the other processes were up and running, the conservation groups became just one of a number of parties at the table. However, we were careful to always be the first to put forward our ideas or drafts as events unfolded. For example, we brought forth the first proposed CIT framework, along with an initial proposed membership. As the conservation financing initiatives took shape, we introduced credible financial and strategic experts to help design the

process. We worked with First Nations to prepare detailed descriptions of how to operationalize EBM. We also drafted briefing materials for government decisions.

Throughout the negotiations, environmental groups consistently ensured that other parties were responding to our ideas, rather than we to theirs. We were co-creating initiatives and ideas in the boardrooms, but we arrived with a clearly articulated set of ideas and plans that already reflected input from experts. We worked with our First Nations partners and allies in other sectors to ensure that the concepts we brought forward reflected the interests of the other parties. This helped us advance our objectives both within the negotiating room, and in the external realm of public communications.

This tactic reflects a classic rule of negotiation: Frame the challenge to support the solution you want to see. By keeping control of the frame, we ensured that the outcome of the process met our objectives. We were

successful in this strategy because we had the resources to retain our own staff, and independent experts who could conduct research and analyses. We had skilled negotiators, and we trained them. We also invested a great deal of time in planning, so we rarely found ourselves forced into a reactive position. By staying out in front of the process, we gave ourselves the space to innovate and explore creative ideas.

One of the big tipping points was when everyone committed to ecosystem-based management, a new way of dealing with the forests. No one knew what EBM looked like. We had some principles and no one knew what would happen if we gave those to a science team. It was putting the idea into a 'black box.' But the status quo was not an option, and so everyone agreed and said, 'let's try on the EBM dress.'

—Dr. Jody Holmes, Rainforest Solutions Project I remember sitting in an office with Merran and Linda Coady (Weyerhauser) in the early years, with a blank flip chart saying, 'OK, what do we need for this to be successful?' And it was clear that we needed extra financing to help parties through this new type of solution. The three of us spent an hour and developed a map for developing conservation financing. And that is exactly what was announced in 2007—the CIII package. And the flip chart was exactly the path that it took to get there.

Ross McMillan, then advisor to the philanthropic foundations







To do this stuff, to do EBM, to create change like this, you actually need a particular kind of person and organization. People who are willing to set aside egos and work for the greater good of the ideas, and who get jazzed and excited about it.

-Dr. Jody Holmes

If some had been driven by ego, they would have alienated people from the ideas.

-Ross McMillan



PRACTICE HUMILITY Lose your ego.

As Harry Truman once observed, "It's amazing what you can accomplish if you don't care who gets the credit." In the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, we learned that the president's advice made a great deal of sense—on personal, organizational, and even sectoral levels.

The Great Bear Rainforest campaign began more than a decade ago, and has its roots in a movement that goes back at least another twenty years. Countless activists, organizations, and supporters contributed to every aspect of the project—from raising public awareness to conducting groundbreaking science. Every one of these individuals and organizations can tell a story highlighting their achievements. We soon learned there is little to be gained from arguing over who deserves the credit, and indeed there is much to celebrate in the fact that so many people feel a sense of ownership of the work.

To succeed in a coalition, you need to know when to let go of your ego and your need for recognition. Although our organizations worked collaboratively on this effort, each also remained a fiercely independent body pursuing its own objectives, and none wanted to be subsumed into a collective identity. We tried to balance the need for group effort and individual profile by consciously taking turns, giving each of our member groups and negotiators an opportunity to shine.

More broadly, we also learned to give up the idea that we were working towards a win for the conservation movement. As non-profit communications consultants Dick Brooks and Michael Goldberg once said, we learned to distinguish advocacy from marketing. For our advocacy to be effective—that is, for the campaign to succeed—the solution needed to be advanced by groups other than environmental organizations. First Nations, labour leaders, industry CEOs, and business people were, in many cases, much more effective spokespeople than we were, because their voices carried weight where ours did not. In the end, broad-based support for the solutions package hinged on the fact that it was not seen as an "environmental" initiative.

Happily, our funders also recognized this distinction. They measured our success not by the public profile of our own organizations, or by the media attention the conservation movement earned, but by the degree to which other parties embraced our solutions.

Most of the Great Bear Rainforest outcomes were a "co-creation" of the different groups—First Nations, logging companies, government and environmental organizations. There are times when it is right to demand acknowledgement for our work, and to advertise our accomplishments—whether personal, organizational, or sectoral. There are also times when it is essential to allow others, even encourage others, to claim the spotlight and to take ownership of successes. We learned how to know the difference.



It took coming up with a good idea and persistence and optimism to stick with it. It took having a game plan, and having the optimism to stick with the vision.

-Ross McMillan

Maybe the lesson really is about time. You don't create this scale of change overnight. In order to make it happen you need to know you're in it for the long haul, and you need endurance. People are learning as they go along and that is why you can't jump the stages. It is a process of discovery.

-Dr. Jody Holmes

One of the lessons was the importance of perseverance. Unquestionably. There would have been so many times it would have been easy to say, 'this is too difficult'.

—Dan Johnston

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STAY POSITIVE: Persistent optimism is infectious.

All essential advocacy work requires a potent mix of vision, people, power, and innovation. However, without the confidence that you will get where you want to go, all these tools are effectively useless. The Great Bear Rainforest vision inspired hope for a better tomorrow. That optimism—combined with confidence in ourselves and our teams—sustained us. We didn't give up, even when it seemed everything would fall apart.

For us, "hope" was not a naïve hunch that things would somehow work out. It was confidence that our efforts were worthwhile, and that we had the skills and energy to overcome whatever challenges might arise. On a practical level, this meant accepting a degree of risk and uncertainty. Across years of negotiations and dialogues, we knew what we were working for, not just what we were against. However, there were often times when we could map our movements no further than the first few steps toward our goals; the rest of the path remained murky.

It took leadership to hold the vision, and know that we would figure the next steps out when we got closer. It took leadership and persistent optimism to instill confidence in everyone—funders, CEOs, executive directors, elected offi-

cials, First Nations chiefs—that we could and would succeed.

In part, we kept our spirits up through "personal ecology"—the principle that if we wished to sustain our work as effective advocates for the planet, we must care for ourselves. Initiatives like the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement consume years, even decades, of dedicated effort. Burnout was not an option.

We made a point of deliberately and regularly reconnecting with our sense of purpose, and with the ideas or individuals that give us confidence. In this way we infused our work with positive energy, hope, and the drive that comes from a deep sense of purpose.




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APPENDIX 1 EBM Principles



Principles and Goals of Ecosystem-based Management April 2001

In April 2001, as part of several agreements between the Province of British Columbia, First Nations governments from the Central and North Coasts and Haida Gwaii, local governments and non-government interests, a coastal consensus on the definition, principles and goals of ecosystem-based management was established for what would become the Coast Information Team (CIT) analysis area. Parties to the agreements made a commitment to implement EBM as a means of achieving "healthy, fully functioning ecosystems and human communities".

April 2001 Principles and Goals of Ecosystem-based Management

(excerpted from the CCLRMP Framework Agreement/Draft Interim Plan, April 2001)

#	Overarching Principles
1	Healthy, fully functioning ecosystems provide the basis for sustaining communities, economies, cultures and the quality of human life therefore ecological sustainability is fundamental to land and marine management.
2	Empowered and healthy communities play a leadership role in sustaining healthy eco-systems, cultures and economies.
3	Focus planning on the needs of the ecosystems and the values that you want to maintain.
4	Planning should be done over ecologically and economically relevant time frames and involve regional, landscape and site scale planning.
5	Incorporate the best of existing knowledge (e.g. traditional, local and western science) into planning and decision-making.
6	Knowledge of natural processes and human interactions is incomplete and inherently limited, and decisions made in the present can pose unacceptable risks for the future. Apply the Precautionary Principle and practice adaptive management in decision-making. Monitor the consequences of decisions and adopt a learning approach to planning.
7	Maintain natural, social and economic capital in the region and preserve the full range of options for future generations.
8	Respect individuals, communities of interest (including businesses) and cultures.
	Recognition of FN history and rights
9	Respect and acknowledge aboriginal rights and title as defined by the Constitution and case law.
10	First Nations of the Central Coast should be engaged with the governments of BC and Canada in a process to reconcile outstanding land issues involving aboriginal rights and title including securing interim measures agreements.
11	Support the efforts of First Nations to establish government-to-government to government tables with the objective of developing interim measures agreements.
12	Aboriginal settlements must be based upon mutual trust, respect and understanding. They must be fair and equitable and recognize the interests and aspirations of individual First Nations including providing tools and resources to enable social and economic prosperity for First Nation people as well as other people of BC.
	Ecological Principles
13	Sustain the biological richness and the biological services provided by natural terrestrial and marine processes at all scales through time (e.g. water quality, soils and vegetative productivity, species richness, predator/prey interactions, etc.).
13a	Conserve hydro riparian areas and maintain hydro riparian functions.
13b	Ensure an appropriate level of ecological representation and habitat connectivity.
13c	Protect and conserve focal species, as well as rare, threatened and endangered species and their habitats as a priority.



12-	Dustrati constitui a saila and unatable torrain
13e	Protect sensitive soils and unstable terrain.
13f	Sustain the structure, function and composition of natural ecosystems including the land-sea interface.
13g	Incorporate ecological restoration of degraded landscapes, stands and sites into forest management.
13h	Avoid the introduction of alien species
13i	Sustain adequate levels of spawning biomass and population age structure of all aquatic species (e.g., rock fish, lingcod, salmon).
13j	Recognize that the dynamics and resiliency of ecosystems vary.
14	Establish a credible terrestrial and marine protection area system that contributes to sustaining the biological richness and the biological services provided by natural terrestrial and marine processes.
15	Use zoning as a management and planning tool.
16	Sustain human communities within the limits of ecosystem processes.
16a	Ensure that the consumptive use of natural resources is maintained within limits that can be sustained.
16b	Employ resource use techniques that emphasize low environmental impact and ensure that activities do not degrade ecosystems or conflict with meeting conservation goals.
16c	Ensure that the harvesting of natural resources and rates of harvest are an output of planning and do not compromise the long-term ecological integrity of landscapes and watersheds.
16d	Ensure sustainable harvest of old growth (250 years +) and second growth timber.
16e	Ensure that the development of non-renewable resources is undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the ecosystem framework.
16f	Redefine tenure arrangements to make them more ecologically relevant.
	Socioeconomic Principles
17	Promote the well being of the communities in the Central Coast for this and future generations.
18	Recognize the interests of work communities on the Central Coast whose residents live outside the Central Coast.
19	Maintain the historical, current and future unique qualities of life on the Central Coast as a basis for diversified economic activity.
20	A diversity of economic opportunities is key to healthy communities and sustainable economies. Diversification should include both the local development of different economic activities as well as local involvement in different levels of existing activities.
21	Provide greater local employment and economic benefits to communities through increased local access to local resources.
22	Build community economic capacity including employment and business opportunities beginning with communities in the Plan Area. Ensure access to leadership, decision-making, business planning and management skills training.
23	Redefine tenure arrangements to make them more equitable.
24	Encourage diverse and innovative options that increase the employment, economic development, revenue, cultural and environmental amenities and other benefits derived from resources.
25	Recognize the financial investment and economic contribution of the full range of existing economic enterprises and their employees and shareholders.
25a	Seek new ways of deploying existing investments within the context of these principles and goals.
25b	Increase the economic viability and sustainability of existing investments within the context of these principles and goals.
25c	Incorporate potential economic contributions of local, regional and global interests.
26	Seek out and encourage new and innovative investment opportunities in the region in support of these goals and attract capital investments in those opportunities.



26a	Explore innovative ownership structures (including private ownership), rights allocations and opportunities to share assets or business functions.
27	Ensure the full range of impacts and opportunities are considered in decision-making. Develop full-cost accounting tools and models to assess opportunities and impacts of resource management alternatives.
28	Do more with less: prioritize business and economic strategies based on quality, adding value and decreasing material throughput thereby improving economic and ecological outcomes.
29	When land use decisions are made in the public's best interests the costs of such decisions should not be visited on individual parties. Thus, direct loss of economic livelihood or employment resulting from a breach of contract resulting from land use planning decisions must be subject to mitigation first and fair and timely compensation as a last resort.
	Principles of Information and Adaptive Management
30	Practice Adaptive Management
30a	Identify benchmarks against which future management performance can be measured.
30b	Establish explicit objectives for managing risk.
30c	Incorporate science, local and traditional knowledge and available data into management decisions.
30d	Identify research and inventory priorities that will increase the effectiveness of ecosystem-based planning and management in the future.
30e	Monitor performance and outcomes for the purpose of adapting and improving planning and management.
31	Adopt a coordinated approach to information management.
	Principles for Managing Ecosystem-based Planning Processes
	Follow up processes shall:
32a	be neutrally administered
32b	be transparent
32c	ensure full public access to relevant information necessary to make informed decisions
32d	consider all community and other interests affected
32e	look to find common ground
32f	respectful of the diverse values, traditions and aspirations of local communities
32g	fair
32h	efficient and effective (efficient use of time and resources)
32i	measurable and enforceable (decisions must be properly monitored and enforced)
32j	adaptive and flexible (capable of modifying decisions in response to technological innovations, field experience, shifts in social preferences and new information)
32k	comprehensive and integrated (cross sector and addressing the full range of economic, social and environmental concerns and values)
321	accountable (decision makers must be accountable to all participants in the process as well as to the broader public)
33	Recognizing regional, provincial, national and international interests establish collaborative, land use planning and decision-making processes that empower, and build capacity, within local communities.
34	Resolve conflicts with generosity, compassion and clear understanding.
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APPENDIX 2 About The Coast Information Team

COAST INFORMATION TEAM

In 2002, the Government of British Columbia, First Nations governments, the forest industry, environmental groups, communities and later the federal government together established the Coast Information Team (CIT). The team worked with government technical planning teams to provide independent information, science, and analyses to establish and support ecosystem-based management in the north and central coastal region of British Columbia, including Haida Gwaii.

This information assisted the subregional Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) Central Coast and North Coast and Haida Gwaii land-use planning tables—in addition to several First Nations Land Use Planning (LUP) tables—in developing practical recommendations to resolve land-use and natural-resource-management issues. The team delivered tools to assist with planning, management, and conservation at the subregional, land-scape, watershed, and site levels.

The CIT became operational in January 2002, and completed its work in March 2004. Of the group's CAD \$3.3 million budget, the provincial government funded 58 percent, environmental non-government organizations and forest-products companies each contributed 18 percent, and the Government of Canada provided six percent.

The CIT brought independent science, informed by local and traditional knowledge, to British Columbia's standard strategic land-use planning model. It improved this planning and other processes by providing:

Regional context

The CIT analyses and assessments offered a regional context for evaluating the ecological, cultural, or economic importance of particular areas, and helped inform subregional, landscape, and site-level decision making.

Ecosystem-based management

The CIT developed an approach to EBM based on ecosystem and human well-being. The CIT provided clear principles, goals and objectives, ecological management targets, implementation tools such as a planning handbook and hydroriparian guide, and tangible procedural steps to guide EBM implementation in coastal British Columbia.

Comprehensive, multidisciplinary analyses

The team conducted cultural, economic, and ecosystem spatial analyses to identify areas for cultural uses, economic development, and biodiversity conservation.

Well-being assessment

A well-being assessment measured environmental and socio-economic conditions and trends in the region.

Independence and international credibility
The team took particular care to undertake independent and internationally credible analyses and assessments.

For more information on the Coastal Information Team, including an archive of all products created, visit http://archive.ilmb.gov.bc.ca/citbc/

APPENDIX 3 Conservation Investments and Incentives Initiative Briefing Note



A Canadian

Conservation

Model of

Global

Significance



The wolves of the Great Bear Rainforest are genetically distinct from their inland cousins.

On the mainland coast of British Columbia, opposite the northern end of Vancouver Island, north to the Alaskan border, the Great Bear Rainforest stretches for more than 400 kilometres. Like the rainforests of the nearby island archipelago of the Haida Gwaii (also known as the Queen Charlotte Islands), the Great Bear Rainforest has been peopled by First Nations for more than 10,000 years. It is a land of history and legend, mist and waterfalls—an ancient rainforest laced with rivers and cut with fjords.

Today, it is a threatened wilderness of giant cedars and Sitka spruce, a haven for salmon, wolves and ghostly white bears. At 21 million acres, the Great Bear Rainforest is part of the largest coastal temperate rainforest left on Earth.

Born of a complex interaction between oceans, mountains, forests and rain, coastal temperate rainforests are considered more threatened than tropical rainforests. Scientists estimate that nearly 60 percent of our planet's original coastal temperate rainforests have been destroyed by logging and development. The Great Bear Rainforest represents fully one quarter of what remains.

Decisions are being made right now that will determine the future of the Great Bear Rainforest. Following the conclusion of negotiations with First Nations, historic land use agreements in British Columbia could ultimately provide full protection for as much as 30 percent of the Great Bear Rainforest's 21 million acres and establish a process to develop ecosystem-based management practices for the entire rainforest.

These unprecedented consensus agreements between the Great Bear Rainforest's main constituencies—local, regional and provincial governments, industry, communities, workers, small businesses and environmental organizations— offer a rare opportunity to create a new global model of lasting conservation in the region.



The Great Bear Rainforest

What's at Stake Community & Tradition

The Great Bear Rainforest is the ancestral and current home of many coastal First Nations that have lived on the bounty of the forest and the ocean for more than 10,000 years. Their histories, identities and spirituality are inextricably linked to the lands and waters of the rainforest. Oral traditions, songs, art, ceremonies and place names passed down for generations connect people with their environment. The loss of the Great Bear Rainforest could ultimately mean the loss of some of the oldest surviving cultures in the Western Hemisphere.

By definition and design, the consensus agreements in the Great Bear Rainforest are dependent upon local support for success. A coalition of environmental non-governmental organizations—Greenpeace Canada, Sierra Club of Canada-British Columbia Chapter, ForestEthics and the Rainforest Action Network—has engaged with a diverse range of stakeholders to work towards a consensus for long-term conservation in the region. These groups have also been working with a coalition of Canadian and U.S. foundations to explore conservation and community-development options.

The Great Bear Rainforest is valuable both economically and as an irreplaceable ecosystem. The development of dedicated public and private funding sources that support conservation as well as community stability of First Nations is key to ensuring the successful implementation of the consensus agreements.

An ecosystem of global importance, the Great Bear Rainforest is also a vital natural and economic resource for British Columbia. To be successful, conservation here must be more than a wilderness agreement. To be successful in this complicated political, economic and environmental landscape, conservation in the Great Bear Rainforest must not only protect the ecosystem, but also respect indigenous cultures, and strengthen the economies of local communities that depend upon the rainforest for their way of life.

Campaign for the Great Bear Rainforest

The Campaign for the Great Bear Rainforest is designed to help ensure a healthy future for 21 million acres of coastal temperate rainforest. Conservation investments are expected to be held and managed in a conservation endowment fund. Grants for work in the Great Bear Rainforest will likely be distributed through two separate funding sources.

Conservation Endowment Fund

A conservation endowment fund raised from private, philanthropic sources will be dedicated solely to science and stewardship jobs and activities in First Nation communities. This fund will be used for restoration projects and conservation management, such as Forest Watchman jobs, and would be treated as an enduring endowment. Tides Canada Foundation's fundraising efforts will be targeted to this endowment and related activities.

Economic Development Fund

An Economic Development Fund created from Canadian government contributions will be dedicated to investments in ecologically sustainable business ventures within the First Nation territories or communities. This fund will enable First Nations to launch conservation-based businesses that value and preserve the environment. From the perspective of both the provincial government of British Columbia and the First Nation governments, it is vital that any proposed solutions for the Great Bear Rainforest blend conservation outcomes with new economic development resources.

A separate, proposed Socially Responsible Investment component would allocate funds to qualifying businesses for business development loans and venture capital funding. Private, philanthropic funding helps drive the commitment of government funds to support the land use agreements and will also support First Nation commitments to conservation outcomes.



The Great Bear Rainforest is one of the last true wildernesses remaining on Earth.

These conservation investments will support economic development in First Nations communities that commit to managing their ancestral land base under ecosystem-based management as well as protecting large portions of their lands in designated protected areas. Ecosystem-based management is an adaptive approach that seeks to incorporate ecological, socio-economic and cultural needs into the creation of long-term, sustainable land use implementation plans.

Tides Canada Foundation

Tides Canada Foundation is leading the Canadian fundraising initiative to help ensure the successful implementation of the historic land use agreements.

As Canada's only national public foundation focused on supporting environmental and social causes, Tides Canada brings a unique contribution to the Great Bear Rainforest campaign. Having supported the coalition-building and scientific research that contributed to this agreement, Tides Canada is privileged to provide the opportunity for the broader Canadian philanthropic community to participate in ensuring this spectacular and unique conservation vision is realized.

Tides Canada Foundation and The Nature Conservancy are working together to raise funds for this initiative in Canada and the United States.

Today's initiative is based on the pioneering efforts of Greenpeace Canada, Sierra Club of Canada- British Columbia Chapter, ForestEthics and the Rainforest Action Network, who have worked for years to craft a conservation solution for the coast of British Columbia.

WHATS AT STAKE UNIQUE SPECIES & HABITAT

Salmon are an important species in the Great Bear Rainforest and a critical source of nutrients for the health and productivity of the entire ecosystem.

The salmon sustain the forest and the species that depend upon it for survival, including wolves, grizzly bears, black bears and the rare white Spirit Bears. In all the world, these bears—a subspecies of black bears with a recessive gene that results in their white color—are found in numbers only in the Great Bear Rainforest region.



Spirit Bear



Coastal temperate rainforest is a complex ecosystem. The understory is carpeted by dozens of plants, mosses and lichens that depend on the trees for sustenance.

All photographs copyright Ian McAllister / Raincoast.org

Tides Canada Foundation

Tim Draimin Executive Director Tides Canada Foundation tim@tidescanada.org 866-843-3722 ext. 244

Ross McMillan Senior Advisor, Conservation Tides Canada Foundation ross@tidescanada.org 250-725-2285 This is a complicated project with many challenges, but one point stands out over all others. Nowhere else in the world have we seen the potential for an integrated conservation and compatible land use solution of this magnitude. But until the agreements are finalized, financed and implemented, the Great Bear Rainforest will remain under threat.

A timely commitment of private, philanthropic funds is essential to helping ensure that the consensus land use agreements are successfully implemented and maintained.

The Great Bear Rainforest cannot be saved in pieces and it will not be saved until we can give real meaning to the connection between the economy and the environment. The chance to ensure a healthy future for the Great Bear Rainforest reaches beyond the piecemeal preservation of a few, isolated valleys and sets the stage for a broad-based transformation in land use and forestry practices. And it aims to sustain the region's ecosystem and the communities within it as a single, unbroken whole.

Ultimately, the opportunity in the Great Bear Rainforest is about more than the preservation of one beautiful place. This project is a global model of what conservation must become in the 21st century—an inherent part of economies, environments and cultures. But we must act now, or our best chance to preserve the Great Bear Rainforest will be lost forever.

A coalition of four environmental non-governmental organizations—Greenpeace Canada, Sierra Club of Canada-British Columbia Chapter, ForestEthics and Rainforest Action Network—has engaged with a diverse range of stakeholders to work towards consensus for the long-term preservation of the Great Bear Rainforest. These groups have also been working with a coalition of Canadian and U.S. philanthropic foundations to support conservation and community development opportunities.


Tides Canada Foundation is assisting in the Great Bear Rainforest project by leading the Canadian fundraising initiative to help ensure the successful implementation of the historic land use agreements. Tides Canada Foundation and The Nature Conservancy are working together to raise funds for this initiative in Canada and the United States.

APPENDIX 4 EBM Risk Thresholds



Coast Information Team EBM Planning Handbook March 2004


Figure 2.4 Example allocation of risk management targets across scales.



The approach can be summarized as follows:

- The goal at regional and territory/subregional scales is to maintain ecological integrity by achieving management that does not exceed low risk for all environmental indicators.
- Landscape management targets may range up to moderate risk; however on average the risk
 across all landscapes within the territory/subregion should be within the low range. Protected
 areas are assumed to be within RONV or at very low risk.
- Watershed management targets may range up to the high risk threshold; however on average the
 risk across all watersheds within a landscape should be within the range of the landscape targets.
- Site-level management is contingent on watershed targets and the condition of the watershed
 relative to those targets. Site planning, for example, must consider watershed condition relative to
 watershed targets and develop site plans that protect and where necessary restore elements that
 are at risk (i.e., allocate stand retention to protect rare or at-risk ecosystems and cultural features).
- Different management targets may be allocated in a particular landscape or watershed for specific
 values. For example, low risk targets may be assigned for grizzly bear habitat management (i.e.,
 maintain 70% of grizzly bear habitat in natural condition) in a watershed that will be managed to
 moderate risk to biodiversity (i.e., maintain only 30% of each site series in old seral condition).
- Adaptive co-management should be implemented to assess the effects of a full range of practices, with a focus on assessing the effects in areas managed to higher risk. However, adaptive comanagement cannot be used to rationalize a higher risk approach for particular areas. Allocation

APPENDIX 5 RSP Organizational Diagram



"Coast Opportunities Funds"

(\$120 million)

APPENDIX 6

Board of Directors:

The Board is responsible to a group of 8 "members" representing the Province of British Columbia, the private funders and Participating First Nations.

Conservation Fund

(\$60 million)

- \$60 million has been committed to this fund from Private Funders, of which \$2M has been received.
- \$58M balance will be received when the following conditions are met, and subject to a June 30, 2008 deadline:
- EBM Working Group is established and funded; EBM implementation plan is developed and adopted; EBM legal objectives for North & Central coast are formally established; and 2.025 million hectares are established as protected areas.
- Grants will be made into perpetuity from the income generated each year from this permanent endowment fund.
- Fund is set up as a non-profit charitable foundation

Conservation Initiatives

(\$58 million)

What kinds of projects are eligible?

- Science, research, monitoring;
- Protected Area management planning;
- First Nation participation in Conservation management initiatives:
- Protection / interpretation of biophysical or cultural resources;
- Monitoring of Conservation management plans;
- · Habitat restoration;
- EBM Conservation capacity building

What projects are not eligible?

- · Consultation costs;
- Open net-cage finfish aquaculture;
- Costs associated with statutory obligations of British Columbia/ Canada
- Political activities
- Activities inconsistent with EBM or provincial laws / recommendations of LRFs

Other Conditions:

- Only income earned from this endowment fund can be granted out to projects;
- Grants will be provided to "Participating First Nations" for "conservation activities" in Project Area.
- "Participating First Nations" are First Nations with territory in Project Areas that have signed LUP agreements.
- "Conservation activities" are activities that seek to preserve or enhance the natural environment.
- Grants will be distributed to First Nations based on an established funding formula (with allocations set out in the funding agreement), and approval of applications for eligible projects.

Economic Development Fund

(\$60 million)

- \$30M has been committed and funded from the BC government
- \$30M has been committed and funded from the Canadian federal government
- This fund is set up as a non-profit economic development fund.
- The full \$60M will be paid out as grants within a five-toseven-year timeframe.

Regional Economic Development Projects (\$58 M)

What kinds of projects are eligible?

- Shellfish aquaculture / Fisheries;
- Technology and communication;
- Tourism / Wildlife viewing;
- Nutriceuticals / Mushroom harvesting;
- Non-timber forest products;
- · EBM-compliant forest activities;
- Non-nuclear and non-carbon emitting energy projects;
- · Green building projects;
- Small scale, non-toxic mineral or gem extraction;
- Economic development capital corporation (consistent standards)

What projects are not eligible?

- Activities inconsistent with EBM or provincial laws / recommendations of LRFs;
- · Unsustainable activities;
- Large scale extraction of subsurface resources;
- · Consultation costs;
- Fishing licenses for stocks targeted for harvest reduction;
- · Open net-cage finfish aquaculture;
- Trophy hunting for game
- · Bear and/or carnivore hunting:
- Costs associated with statutory obligations of British Columbia / Canada
- Political activities

Other Conditions:

- Projects must be economically and environmentally feasible and sustainable.
- Grants will be made to local and regionally focused economic development projects in the Project Area, proposed by a Participating First Nation.
- "Participating First Nations" mean, for the initial \$30M, First
 Nations with territory in Project Area that have signed a LUP agreement, and, for the remaining \$30M to be granted thereafter, all
 First Nations with territory in the Project Area
- Grants will be distributed to First Nations based on an established funding formula (with allocations set out in the funding agreement), and upon approval of applications for eligible projects.